Learning, Probabilities and Causality, Part 2

Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devijver, Eric Gaussier

emilie.devijver@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr

Course overview

Session 1 Friday 25 November (E. Devijver) Introduction to causal graphical models

- Session 2 Friday 2 December (E. Gaussier C. Assaad) Structural equation models, structural causal models Causal discovery: constraint-based methods
- Session 3 Friday 9 December (E. Devijver) Lab on introduction to graphs and PC algorithm
- Session 4 Friday 16 December (C. Assaad, E. Gaussier) Causal discovery: noise-based, score-based and other methods
- Session 5 Friday 6 January (C. Assaad, E. Devijver) Backdoor and frontdoor criteria Do-calculus
- Session 6 Friday 13 January (C. Assaad, E. Gaussier) History Lab on Simpson's paradox

Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devij

Introduction

Preliminaries Causes and effects Probabilistic causal models

Bayesian networks (graphs and probabilities) Basic graph concepts Graphs and probabilities Conditional independencies in Bayesian networks

Markov equivalence of Bayesian networks

Markov condition in practice




Does Obesity Shorten Life? Or is it the Soda? (Pearl, 2018)




Many applications in machine learning, medecine (science in general), root cause analysis, ...

Does Obesity Shorten Life? Or is it the Soda? (Pearl, 2018)



Many applications in machine learning, medecine (science in general), root cause analysis, ...

Does Obesity Shorten Life? Or is it the Soda? (Pearl, 2018)



Many applications in machine learning, medecine (science in general), root cause analysis, ...

Causes and effects

The same causes produce the same effects ..., do they?

- Smoking causes lung cancer
- The sound of your alarm makes you wake up
- Cause: I flipped the light switch Effect: the light came on

Probabilities are used to capture uncertainty/indeterminacy

Causes and effects

The same causes produce the same effects ..., do they?

Smoking causes lung cancer

- The sound of your alarm makes you wake up
- Cause: I flipped the light switch Effect: the light came on

Probabilities are used to capture uncertainty/indeterminacy

Causes and effects

The same causes produce the same effects ..., do they?

- Smoking causes lung cancer
- The sound of your alarm makes you wake up
- Cause: I flipped the light switch Effect: the light came on

Probabilities are used to capture uncertainty/indeterminacy

The same causes produce the same effects ..., do they?

- Smoking causes lung cancer
- The sound of your alarm makes you wake up
- Cause: I flipped the light switch Effect: the light came on

Probabilities are used to capture uncertainty/indeterminacy

The same causes produce the same effects ..., do they?

- Smoking causes lung cancer
- The sound of your alarm makes you wake up
- Cause: I flipped the light switch Effect: the light came on

Probabilities are used to capture uncertainty/indeterminacy

(conditional) Independence

Conditional independence of random variables For a distribution *P*, *X* and *Y* are independent conditioned on *Z*, noted $X \perp P Y | Z$, if:

$$P(X, Y|Z) = P(X|Z)P(Y|Z)$$

or $P(X|Y,Z) = P(X|Z)$ if $P(Y,Z) > 0$

Illustration

• $Z \sim Bi(9, 0.5), X | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1)$ and $Y | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1)$

 $Z \sim Bi(3, 0.5), X \sim Exp(1)$ and $Y | X = x \sim 0.15\delta_0 + 0.85Pois(x)$

(conditional) Independence

Conditional independence of random variables For a distribution *P*, *X* and *Y* are independent conditioned on *Z*, noted $X \perp P Y | Z$, if:

$$P(X, Y|Z) = P(X|Z)P(Y|Z)$$

or $P(X|Y,Z) = P(X|Z)$ if $P(Y,Z) > 0$

Illustration

• $Z \sim Bi(9, 0.5), X | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1) \text{ and } Y | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1)$

Z ~ Bi(3, 0.5), X ~ Exp(1) and Y | X = x ~ 0.15δ₀ + 0.85Pois(x)

(conditional) Independence

Conditional independence of random variables For a distribution *P*, *X* and *Y* are independent conditioned on *Z*, noted $X \perp P Y | Z$, if:

$$P(X, Y|Z) = P(X|Z)P(Y|Z)$$

or $P(X|Y,Z) = P(X|Z)$ if $P(Y,Z) > 0$

Illustration

• $Z \sim Bi(9, 0.5), X | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1) \text{ and } Y | Z = z \sim \mathcal{N}(z, 1)$

Probabilistic causal models (1)

- 1. $\ensuremath{\mathcal{U}}$ is a set of unobserved background variables which can't be manipulated
- 2. $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$ is a set of observed variables
- 3. \mathcal{F} is a set of functions s.t. f_i $(1 \le i \le n)$ specifies X_i : $X_i = f(\mathcal{E}_i)$ with $\mathcal{E}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{V}$
- 4. P(U) is a joint distribution over U

- 1. $\ensuremath{\mathcal{U}}$ is a set of unobserved background variables which can't be manipulated
- 2. $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$ is a set of observed variables
- 3. \mathcal{F} is a set of functions s.t. f_i $(1 \le i \le n)$ specifies X_i : $X_i = f(\mathcal{E}_i)$ with $\mathcal{E}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{V}$
- 4. $P(\mathcal{U})$ is a joint distribution over \mathcal{U}

- 1. $\ensuremath{\mathcal{U}}$ is a set of unobserved background variables which can't be manipulated
- 2. $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$ is a set of observed variables
- 3. \mathcal{F} is a set of functions s.t. f_i $(1 \le i \le n)$ specifies X_i : $X_i = f(\mathcal{E}_i)$ with $\mathcal{E}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{V}$
- 4. P(U) is a joint distribution over U

- 1. $\ensuremath{\mathcal{U}}$ is a set of unobserved background variables which can't be manipulated
- 2. $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$ is a set of observed variables
- 3. \mathcal{F} is a set of functions s.t. f_i ($1 \le i \le n$) specifies X_i : $X_i = f(\mathcal{E}_i)$ with $\mathcal{E}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{V}$
- 4. $P(\mathcal{U})$ is a joint distribution over \mathcal{U}

- 1. $\ensuremath{\mathcal{U}}$ is a set of unobserved background variables which can't be manipulated
- 2. $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, ..., X_n\}$ is a set of observed variables
- 3. \mathcal{F} is a set of functions s.t. f_i ($1 \le i \le n$) specifies X_i : $X_i = f(\mathcal{E}_i)$ with $\mathcal{E}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U} \cup \mathcal{V}$
- 4. $P(\mathcal{U})$ is a joint distribution over \mathcal{U}

 $P(\mathcal{U})$ and \mathcal{F} induce a joint distribution over \mathcal{V} :

$$P(\mathcal{V}) = \sum_{u \in D_U} P(\mathcal{V}, u)$$
$$= \sum_{u \in D_U} P(\mathcal{V} | u) P(u)$$
$$= \sum_{u \in D_U} \prod_{i=1}^n P(x_i | x_1, ..., x_{i-1}, u) P(u)$$


Induced graph The graph $\mathcal{G}(M)$ induced by a probabilistic causal model M has vertices \mathcal{V} and an edge $X_i \rightarrow X_j$ whenever f_i depends on X_j . In addition, G contains a bidirected edge, denoted $X_i \leftrightarrow X_j$, whenever f_i and f_j depend on a common subset of \mathcal{U}

Markovian causal model A causal model M is Markovian if the graph induced by M contains no bidirected edges (causal sufficiency) P(V) does not depend on U in Markovian causal models Induced graph The graph $\mathcal{G}(M)$ induced by a probabilistic causal model M has vertices \mathcal{V} and an edge $X_i \rightarrow X_j$ whenever f_i depends on X_j . In addition, G contains a bidirected edge, denoted $X_i \leftrightarrow X_j$, whenever f_i and f_j depend on a common subset of \mathcal{U}

Markovian causal model A causal model M is Markovian if the graph induced by M contains no bidirected edges (causal sufficiency) P(V) does not depend on U in Markovian causal models

Example

 X_1 : season (can take on 4 values) X_2 : rain (binary yes/no) X_3 : sprinkler (binary on/off) X_4 : wet (binary yes/no) X_5 : slippery (binary yes/no)




With no confounders:

$$P(\mathcal{V}) = P(X_1)P(X_2 | X_1)P(X_3 | X_1)$$
$$P(X_4 | X_2, X_3)P(X_5 | X_4)$$

Example

 X_1 : season (can take on 4 values) X_2 : rain (binary yes/no) X_3 : sprinkler (binary on/off) X_4 : wet (binary yes/no) X_5 : slippery (binary yes/no)




With no confounders:


$$P(\mathcal{V}) = P(X_1)P(X_2 | X_1)P(X_3 | X_1)$$

$$P(X_4 | X_2, X_3)P(X_5 | X_4)$$

Example (cont'd)








Introduction

Example (cont'd)

Conditioning

$$P(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5 | X_3 = off) = \frac{P(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5, X_3 = off)}{\sum_{X_1} P(X_1 = x_1) P(X_3 = off | X_1 = x_1)}$$

=
$$\frac{P(X_1) P(X_2 | X_1) P(X_3 = off | X_1) P(X_4 | X_2, X_3 = off) P(X_5 | X_4)}{\sum_{X_1} P(X_1 = x_1) P(X_3 = off | X_1 = x_1)}$$




Introduction

Example (cont'd)

Intervention

 $P_{X_3 = off}(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5) = P(X_1)P(X_2 \mid X_1)P(X_4 \mid X_2, X_3 = off)P(X_5 \mid X_4)$



Conditioning vs intervention

 $P(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5 | X_3 = off)$ vs $P_{X_3=off}(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5)$

Identification (identifiability)

Conditioning vs intervention

 $P(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5 | X_3 = off)$ vs $P_{X_3=off}(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5)$

Identification (identifiability)

Conditioning vs intervention

 $P(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5 | X_3 = off)$ vs $P_{X_3=off}(X_1, X_2, X_4, X_5)$

Identification (identifiability)

Causation in the interventional theory

- A causes B if and only if there is a possible intervention on A which changes B
- An intervention on A must completely disrupt the causal relation between A and its previous causes so that the value of A is entirely fixed by this intervention

Causation in the interventional theory

- A causes B if and only if there is a possible intervention on A which changes B
- An intervention on A must completely disrupt the causal relation between A and its previous causes so that the value of A is entirely fixed by this intervention

Causation in the interventional theory

- A causes B if and only if there is a possible intervention on A which changes B
- An intervention on A must completely disrupt the causal relation between A and its previous causes so that the value of A is entirely fixed by this intervention

Causal discovery vs causal inference

Causal discovery From observational data, infer causal graph with or without hidden confounders (hidden common causes) - courses 2, 3 and 4

Causal inference Reasoning on the causal graph through interventions (and asking counterfactual questions) - courses 5 and 6



Causal discovery vs causal inference

Causal discovery From observational data, infer causal graph with or without hidden confounders (hidden common causes) - courses 2, 3 and 4


Causal inference Reasoning on the causal graph through interventions (and asking counterfactual questions) - courses 5 and 6



Causal discovery vs causal inference

Causal discovery From observational data, infer causal graph with or without hidden confounders (hidden common causes) - courses 2, 3 and 4

Causal inference Reasoning on the causal graph through interventions (and asking counterfactual questions) - courses 5 and 6



Preliminaries Causes and effects Probabilistic causal models


Bayesian networks (graphs and probabilities) Basic graph concepts Graphs and probabilities Conditional independencies in Bayesian networks

Markov equivalence of Bayesian networks


Markov condition in practice

Basic graph concepts


Let us consider the following graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$:




Directed path: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow E \rightarrow F \rightarrow G$ ($A \rightsquigarrow G$)




Path (trail): $D \leftarrow B \rightarrow E \leftarrow C$ ($D \circ \cdots \circ C$)




Parents, ancestors: $Pa(E) = \{B, C\}$, An: transitive closure of the parents relation




Parents, ancestors: $Pa(E) = \{B, C\}$, $An(E) = \{A, B, C, E\}$ An: transitive closure of the parents relation




Children, descendants: $Ch(C) = \{E, F\}$, De: transitive closure of the children relation




Children, descendants: $Ch(C) = \{E, F\}, De(C) = \{C, E, F, G\}$ De: transitive closure of the children relation



Upwards-closed sets: a subset of nodes S is upward-closed (or ancestral) if $\forall S \in S$, $An(S) \subseteq S$



Induced subgraph $\mathcal{G}[\mathcal{S}]$: $\mathcal{G}[\{B, C, D, F\}]$




A Bayesian network is a DAG (directed acyclic graph) $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ along with a joint distribution $P(\mathcal{V})$ that admits the factorization $P(\mathcal{V}) = \prod_{X \in \mathcal{V}} P(X | Pa_G(X))$

Compatibility We say that a distribution $P(\mathcal{V})$ is compatible with (or Markov relative to) a DAG $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ if $P(\mathcal{V}) = \prod_{X \in \mathcal{V}} P(X | Pa(X))$. We denote by $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{V})$ the set of distributions compatible with \mathcal{G} .

Observation

Upwards-closed set If *P* is compatible with \mathcal{G} and $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ is upwards-closed, then $P(\mathcal{S})$ is compatible with $\mathcal{G}[\mathcal{S}]$, *i.e.*, $P(\mathcal{S}) = \prod_{\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{S}} P(\mathcal{S} | Pa(\mathcal{S}))$




Markov conditions

Ordered Markov condition P is compatible with G *iff* in any topological ordering each X_i is independent of its non-descendants given its parents

Topological ordering: for any edge $X_i \rightarrow X_j$, i < j

Parental Markov condition P is compatible with G iff every variable is independent of its non-descendants given its parents



Property For disjoint $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, if $An(\mathcal{X}) \cap An(\mathcal{Y}) \subseteq \mathcal{Z}$ and $An(\mathcal{Z}) \subseteq (\mathcal{Z})$, then

$$\mathcal{X} \coprod_{P} \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$$

i.e., $P(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}) = P(\mathcal{X} | \mathcal{Z}) P(\mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z})$

in any distribution P compatible with G


Causal Bayesian networks


Causal Markov condition Every Markovian causal model M induces a distribution that is compatible with the induced graph $\mathcal{G}[M]$

Causal Bayesian network (Pearl 2000) Let $P(\mathcal{V})$ be a probability distribution and let $P_s(\mathcal{V})$ denote the distribution resulting from the intervention that sets a subset S of variables to constants *s*. Let \mathcal{P}_* denote the set of all interventional distributions $P_s(\mathcal{V})$. A DAG \mathcal{G} is said to be a *causal Bayesian network* compatible with \mathcal{P}_* *iff* for every $P_s(\mathcal{V}) \in \mathcal{P}_*$:

- (i) $P_s(\mathcal{V})$ is Markov relative to \mathcal{G}
- (ii) $P_s(s_i) = 1$ or all $S_i \in S$ whenever s_i is consistent with S = s
- (ii) $P_s(x_i | Pa(X_i)) = P(x_i | Pa(X_i))$ for all $X_i \notin S$ whenever $Pa(X_i)$ is consistent with S = s

Causal Bayesian networks: example






Exploiting (in)dependencies in observational data

 $X, Y \sim U(-1, 1)$






Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devij



Exploiting (in)dependencies in observational data


 $X, Y \sim U(-1, 1)$





Corr(X, Y) = 0.00


Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devij




Exploiting (in)dependencies in observational data

X, *Y* ~ U(-1, 1)







Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devij



Exploiting (in)dependencies in observational data

X, *Y* ~ U(-1, 1)






Corr(X; Y | Z > 0.5) = 0.8


Charles K. Assaad, Emilie Devij

What conditional independencies hold in a distribution P compatible with a given graph G?




> A ⊥⊥_P D | B
 > E ⊥⊥_P F | C
 > B ⊥⊥_P F | E?

What conditional independencies hold in a distribution P compatible with a given graph G?




A ⊥⊥_P D | B E ⊥⊥_P F | C B ⊥⊥_P F | E?

What conditional independencies hold in a distribution P compatible with a given graph G?




A ⊥⊥_P D | B
 E ⊥⊥_P F | C
 B ⊥⊥_P F | E?

What conditional independencies hold in a distribution P compatible with a given graph G?



- ► A ⊥⊥_P D | B
- ► E∦_P F|C
- $B \perp P F | E?$

What conditional independencies hold in a distribution P compatible with a given graph G?



- ► A ⊥⊥_P D | B
- ► E∦_P F|C
- $B \perp P F | E?$

d-Separation

Collider A collider is a directed graph isomorphic to $X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y$. We'll refer to Z in a collider as *the* collider. If the two parent vertices are not adjacent, the collider is a *v*-structure (also called *immorality*)

Active and blocked paths A path is said to be *blocked* by a set of vertices $\mathcal{Z} \in \mathcal{V}$ if:

- it contains a chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ or a fork $A \leftarrow B \rightarrow C$ and $B \in \mathbb{Z}$, or
- it contains a collider $A \rightarrow B \leftarrow C$ such that no descendant of *B* is in \mathcal{Z}

A path that is not blocked is active. A path is active if every triple along the path is active, and blocked if a single triple is blocked

d-Separation

Collider A collider is a directed graph isomorphic to $X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y$. We'll refer to Z in a collider as *the* collider. If the two parent vertices are not adjacent, the collider is a *v*-structure (also called *immorality*)

Active and blocked paths A path is said to be *blocked* by a set of vertices $\mathcal{Z} \in \mathcal{V}$ if:

- it contains a chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ or a fork $A \leftarrow B \rightarrow C$ and $B \in \mathbb{Z}$, or
- it contains a collider A → B ← C such that no descendant of B is in Z

A path that is not blocked is active. A path is active if every triple along the path is active, and blocked if a single triple is blocked

d-Separation

Collider A collider is a directed graph isomorphic to $X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y$. We'll refer to Z in a collider as *the* collider. If the two parent vertices are not adjacent, the collider is a *v*-structure (also called *immorality*)

Active and blocked paths A path is said to be *blocked* by a set of vertices $\mathcal{Z} \in \mathcal{V}$ if:

- it contains a chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ or a fork $A \leftarrow B \rightarrow C$ and $B \in \mathbb{Z}$, or
- it contains a collider A → B ← C such that no descendant of B is in Z

A path that is not blocked is active. A path is active if every triple along the path is active, and blocked if a single triple is blocked d-separation Given disjoint sets $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, we say that \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are *d*-separated by \mathcal{Z} if every path between a node in \mathcal{X} and a node in \mathcal{Y} is blocked by \mathcal{Z} and we write $\mathcal{X} \perp\!\!\!\perp_{G} \mathcal{Y} \mid \!\!\!\mathcal{Z}$. By definition:

$$\mathcal{I}_{d-sep}(\mathcal{G}) \coloneqq \{ \mathcal{X} \coprod_{\mathcal{G}} \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} : \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z} \text{ disjoint sets} \}$$

If one of the above path is not blocked, we say that ${\cal X}$ and ${\cal Y}$ are d-connected given ${\cal Z}$

d-separation Given disjoint sets $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, we say that \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are *d*-separated by \mathcal{Z} if every path between a node in \mathcal{X} and a node in \mathcal{Y} is blocked by \mathcal{Z} and we write $\mathcal{X} \coprod_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$. By definition:

$$\mathcal{I}_{d-sep}(\mathcal{G}) \coloneqq \{ \mathcal{X} \coprod_{G} \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} : \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z} \text{ disjoint sets} \}$$

If one of the above path is not blocked, we say that ${\cal X}$ and ${\cal Y}$ are d-connected given ${\cal Z}$

d-Separation (cont'd)

d-separation characterizes the conditional independencies of distributions compatible with a given DAG

Theorem (probabilistic implications of d-separation)

- (i) Soundness $\mathcal{X} \coprod_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} \Rightarrow \mathcal{X} \coprod_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ in every distribution *P* compatible with \mathcal{G}
- (i) Completeness If X ⊥⊥_P Y | Z holds in all distributions compatible with G, then X ⊥⊥_G Y | Z
- (iii) Completeness (alternate version) If $\mathcal{X} \not\perp_G \mathcal{Y} \mid \mathcal{Z}$, then there exists a distribution *P* compatible with \mathcal{G} such that $\mathcal{X} \not\perp_P \mathcal{Y} \mid \mathcal{Z}$

d-separation characterizes the conditional independencies of distributions compatible with a given DAG

Theorem (probabilistic implications of d-separation)

- (i) Soundness $\mathcal{X} \coprod_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} \Rightarrow \mathcal{X} \coprod_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ in every distribution *P* compatible with \mathcal{G}
- (i) Completeness If X ⊥⊥_P Y | Z holds in all distributions compatible with G, then X ⊥⊥_G Y | Z
- (iii) Completeness (alternate version) If X ↓ G Y | Z, then there exists a distribution P compatible with G such that X ↓ P Y | Z

d-separation characterizes the conditional independencies of distributions compatible with a given DAG

Theorem (probabilistic implications of d-separation)

- (i) Soundness $\mathcal{X} \coprod_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} \Rightarrow \mathcal{X} \coprod_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ in every distribution *P* compatible with \mathcal{G}
- (i) Completeness If $\mathcal{X} \coprod_{P} \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ holds in all distributions compatible with \mathcal{G} , then $\mathcal{X} \coprod_{G} \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$

(iii) Completeness (alternate version) If $\mathcal{X} \not \perp_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$, then there exists a distribution P compatible with \mathcal{G} such that $\mathcal{X} \not \perp_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ d-separation characterizes the conditional independencies of distributions compatible with a given DAG

Theorem (probabilistic implications of d-separation)

- (i) Soundness $\mathcal{X} \coprod_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z} \Rightarrow \mathcal{X} \coprod_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$ in every distribution *P* compatible with \mathcal{G}
- (i) Completeness If X ⊥⊥_P Y | Z holds in all distributions compatible with G, then X ⊥⊥_G Y | Z
- (iii) Completeness (alternate version) If $\mathcal{X} \not \models_G \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$, then there exists a distribution P compatible with \mathcal{G} such that $\mathcal{X} \not \models_P \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{Z}$

Preliminaries Causes and effects Probabilistic causal models

Bayesian networks (graphs and probabilities) Basic graph concepts Graphs and probabilities Conditional independencies in Bayesian networks

Markov equivalence of Bayesian networks


Markov condition in practice

Markov equivalence

Theorem (Markov equivalence) Two DAGs G_1 and G_2 have the same d-separations *iff* they have the same skeleton and the same v-structures

Markov equivalence


Theorem (Markov equivalence) Two DAGs G_1 and G_2 have the same d-separations *iff* they have the same skeleton and the same v-structures



 Skeleton is the undirected graph with same adjacencies

Markov equivalence


Theorem (Markov equivalence) Two DAGs G_1 and G_2 have the same d-separations *iff* they have the same skeleton and the same v-structures



- Skeleton is the undirected graph with same adjacencies
- v-structure: collider X → Z ← Y s.t.
 X and Y are not adjacent

Markov equivalence

Theorem (Markov equivalence) Two DAGs G_1 and G_2 have the same d-separations *iff* they have the same skeleton and the same v-structures



- Skeleton is the undirected graph with same adjacencies
- v-structure: collider $X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y$ s.t. X and Y are not adjacent
- Flipping some edges may not change d-separation

Preliminaries Causes and effects Probabilistic causal models

Bayesian networks (graphs and probabilities) Basic graph concepts Graphs and probabilities Conditional independencies in Bayesian networks

Markov equivalence of Bayesian networks

Markov condition in practice

Causal Markov condition in practice (*i.e.* using observational data) may be too loose. In particular, one wants to impose that the graph does not contain dependencies not present in the observational data

Minimality condition A DAG G compatible with a probability distribution P is said to satisfy the minimality condition if P is not compatible with any proper subgraph of G

May not be sufficient to rule out special cases when the probability distribution leads to cancellation of some causal relations

Faithfulness We say that a graph \mathcal{G} and a compatible probability distribution P are faithful to one another if all and only the conditional independence relations true in P are entailed by the Markov condition applied to \mathcal{G}

Causal Markov condition in practice (*i.e.* using observational data) may be too loose. In particular, one wants to impose that the graph does not contain dependencies not present in the observational data

Minimality condition A DAG \mathcal{G} compatible with a probability distribution P is said to satisfy the minimality condition if P is not compatible with any proper subgraph of \mathcal{G}

May not be sufficient to rule out special cases when the probability distribution leads to cancellation of some causal relations

Faithfulness We say that a graph G and a compatible probability distribution P are faithful to one another if all and only the conditional independence relations true in P are entailed by the Markov condition applied to G

Causal Markov condition in practice (*i.e.* using observational data) may be too loose. In particular, one wants to impose that the graph does not contain dependencies not present in the observational data

Minimality condition A DAG \mathcal{G} compatible with a probability distribution P is said to satisfy the minimality condition if P is not compatible with any proper subgraph of \mathcal{G}

May not be sufficient to rule out special cases when the probability distribution leads to cancellation of some causal relations

Faithfulness We say that a graph \mathcal{G} and a compatible probability distribution P are faithful to one another if all and only the conditional independence relations true in P are entailed by the Markov condition applied to \mathcal{G}

Causal Markov condition in practice (*i.e.* using observational data) may be too loose. In particular, one wants to impose that the graph does not contain dependencies not present in the observational data

Minimality condition A DAG \mathcal{G} compatible with a probability distribution P is said to satisfy the minimality condition if P is not compatible with any proper subgraph of \mathcal{G}


May not be sufficient to rule out special cases when the probability distribution leads to cancellation of some causal relations

Faithfulness We say that a graph \mathcal{G} and a compatible probability distribution P are faithful to one another if all and only the conditional independence relations true in P are entailed by the Markov condition applied to \mathcal{G}

Bayesian networks, causal graphical models



Bayesian networks, causal graphical models



References (1)

Direct inspirations

- An Introduction to Causal Graphical Models, S. Gordon (slides available at https://simons.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/docs/18989/cau22bcspencergordon.pdf)
- 2. An Introduction to Causal Graphical Models, V. Kumar, A. Capiln, C. Park, S. Gordon, L. Schulman (handout available at https://tinyurl.com/causalitybootcamp)
- 3. *Causality*, J. Pearl. Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009

Additional readings

- Equivalence and Synthesis of Causal Models, T. S. Verma, J. Pearl. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1990
- 2. *Graphical aspects of causal models*, T. S. Verma. Technical report R-191, UCLA, 1993
- 3. *Probabilistic Graphical Models: Principles and Techniques*, D. Koller, N. Friedman. MIT Press, 2009
- 4. *Does Obesity Shorten Life? Or is it the Soda?*, J. Pearl. Journal of Causal Inference, 6(2), 2018